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Since there is scant evidence on the role of industrial relations in wage cyclicality, this paper 
analyzes the effect of collective wage contracts and of works councils on real wage growth. 
Using linked employer-employee data for western Germany, we find that works councils 
affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining. Wage adjustments to 
positive and negative economic shocks are not always symmetric. Only under sectoral 
bargaining there is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment. In 
contrast, wage growth in establishments without collective bargaining adjusts only to falling 
unemployment and is unaffected by rising unemployment. 
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Changes in (real) wages are an important vehicle for an economy’s adjustment to 
economic shocks and play a decisive role in a wide array of macroeconomic 
models. Therefore discussions and investigations of wage cyclicality have a long 
history which goes back to Keynes (1936) and beyond.
4 In recent years the 
response of wages to macroeconomic shocks is seen as crucial for explaining the 
high volatility of unemployment (see Pissarides 2009). Up to the early 1990s, most 
macroeconomists believed in evidence from aggregate time series showing that 
real wages were quite stable over the business cycle. However, Solon, Barsky and 
Parker (1994) demonstrated that the true movement of real wages with the 
business cycle is not visible in aggregate data due to a (countercyclical) 
composition bias. Therefore, and due to the growing availability of longitudinal 
micro-level data since the 1990s, attention has shifted to micro-based studies. A 
number of micro studies found that wages in fact change in a procyclical way and 
that wage cyclicality differs between different wage measures and demographic 
groups as well as between job stayers and employees who change employers 
(“movers”).
5 
For Germany, wage cyclicality has been investigated in three recent studies. Based 
on data from the German socio-economic panel, Anger (2007) finds that for the vast 
majority of workers within employer-employee matches hourly wages do not adjust 
to the business cycle, whereas monthly wages respond significantly to the cycle in 
various sub-samples (for instance in the private sector). The latter result is partly 
corroborated by Peng and Siebert (2007) who use the same data set and find real 
wages (including overtime payments, bonuses etc.) to be procyclical in the private 
sector in western Germany. Making use of a different set of data, namely the 
Employment Register of the Federal Employment Agency, Ludsteck (2008) 
compares wage adjustment in West Germany at the aggregate and regional level 
and shows that the latter is much smaller. Moreover, the difference in cyclical wage 
adjustment between stayers and movers is much greater for regional than for 
aggregate unemployment shocks. Ludsteck (2008) speculates that this may result 
from the rather centralized system of collective bargaining in Germany, but due to 
                                             
4   While classical and traditional Keynesian models predict a countercyclical relationship between 
real wages and employment, various modern models suggest that the relationship is procyclical; 
for a brief discussion of the theoretical background, see Swanson (2007). A related, but more 
static approach is taken in the wage curve literature initiated by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) 
which investigates the (negative) relationship between the levels of local unemployment and 
wages; for a survey, see Nijkamp and Poot (2005). 
5   See, e.g., Ziliak, Wilson and Stone (1999), Shin and Solon (2007) and Swanson (2007) for the 
U.S., Hart (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2006, 2007) for the U.K., and Martins (2007) for 
Portugal. For a survey of these and other studies, see Anger (2007). 4 
 
 
lack of data he is not able to directly investigate the impact of wage setting 
institutions. 
This points to a research gap which is also visible in most studies from other 
countries: The possibility that wage setting may differ in different bargaining 
regimes and that labor relations and worker representation at the firm level may 
also play a role is largely neglected in the literature on wage cyclicality.
6 To be sure, 
some authors have tried to compare wage cyclicality between countries with flexible 
and rigid labor markets (see Peng and Siebert 2007 for a comparative study of the 
U.K. and western Germany), and a few studies for the U.S. have found wages of 
union workers to be less procyclical (see Ziliak, Wilson and Stone 1999, Grant 
2003). There is just one study, however, which takes into account collective 
bargaining coverage: Devereux and Hart (2006) find that the wages of uncovered 
workers in Britain appear to be more procyclical than those of workers covered by a 
collective agreement, but the difference is not always statistically significant. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no study which takes account of other institutional 
settings that may influence wage adjustments at company level, such as the 
existence of works councils. 
Taking this research deficit as a starting point, this paper contributes to the 
literature on wage adjustment and wage cyclicality in three ways. First, we focus on 
the role of industrial relations regimes in wage adjustment by taking into account 
collective bargaining at the industry or firm level and the existence of company-
based works councils. Second, in addition to measuring the state of the business 
cycle by changes in the aggregate unemployment rate we also investigate how 
changes in the regional unemployment rate affect wage adjustment in different 
industrial relations regimes and include regional fixed effects, so that we are able to 
distinguish between aggregate cyclical effects and regional variations of effects. 
Third, we distinguish between positive and negative changes in these 
unemployment variables, in such a way testing whether and in which regime wage 
cyclicality differs between recessions and expansions (as found by Martins 2007). 
Disaggregated analyses of this sort are possible since we use a large-scale linked 
employer-employee data set for western Germany which provides rich information 
on employees’ wages and individual characteristics as well as on firm 
characteristics such as bargaining coverage, existence of a works council, sector 
and firm size.  
                                             
6   This is quite surprising given the large literature on the effects of (de)centralized wage bargaining 
on macroeconomic performance started by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), which however has not 
produced clear-cut and stable empirical results; for a survey, see Aidt and Tzannatos (2002). 5 
 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional background of 
wage setting in Germany and discusses the presence and the potential wage 
adjustment effects of various industrial relations regimes. The data and our 
empirical specification are described in section 3. Section 4 presents our results, 
and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The German system of industrial relations is characterized by a dual system of 
worker representation through trade unions and works councils, extensive 
juridification (including co-determination at establishment and company level), 
encompassing organizations on both sides of the labor market, and a system of 
predominantly industry-level collective bargaining (for details, see Keller 2004). The 
constitutionally protected principle of bargaining autonomy gives organizations of 
employers and employees the right to regulate wages and working conditions 
without state interference. Collective agreements are legally binding and may be 
concluded either as multi-employer agreements at industry level or as single-
employer agreements at company level. Collective bargaining is mainly conducted 
at regional industry level, but in certain industries is quite frequent at national or 
company level. It determines blue and white collar pay increases (usually annually) 
as well as job classifications, working time, and working conditions (over longer 
time periods). Collectively agreed norms are minimum terms which means that 
companies bound by (industry- or company-level) collective agreements cannot 
undercut, only improve upon these terms and conditions, through voluntary 
premiums such as higher wages or more holidays. The concrete implementation 
and monitoring of industry-level collective agreements is increasingly relegated to 
company management and works councils. 
According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are mandatory but 
not automatic in all establishments exceeding a size threshold of five permanent 
employees. They are not automatic in that they must be elected (by the entire 
workforce in the establishment). While works councils are formally independent of 
unions, in practice the majority of works councilors are union members. The size of 
the works council is fixed by law and is a function of the establishment’s 
employment level (for more institutional details, see Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 
2001). Works councils have fairly extensive rights of information (on all matters 
related to the discharge of their statutory functions) and consultation (on issues 
such as planned structural alterations to the plant and manpower planning) 
prescribed by law. In addition, and in contrast to continental European counterparts 
of workplace representation, German works councils have co-determination rights 6 
 
 
on what are termed “social matters”. These include remuneration arrangements, the 
regulation of overtime and working hours, and health and safety measures. In 
contrast to unions, works councils may not call a strike, and they are excluded from 
reaching agreement with the employer on wages and working conditions that are 
settled or normally settled by collective agreements between unions and employer 
associations at industry level (unless the latter explicitly authorize works 
agreements of this sort). However, their extensive rights of information, consultation 
and co-determination on many other issues mean that works councils have 
considerable bargaining power which can be used for rent-seeking, and 
unsurprisingly effective wages have been shown to be higher in establishments with 
works councils (e.g. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2001, Hübler and Jirjahn 
2003). 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The presence and coverage of collective agreements and works councils in West 
Germany are shown in Table 1 based on information from the representative IAB 
Establishment Panel (described in detail below). It can be seen that in 1999, the 
starting year of our investigation, industry-level collective agreements applied in 
53.4 percent of private-sector establishments with five or more employees, covering 
65.6 percent of all workers. Single-employer collective agreements at firm level 
were found in almost 4 percent of establishments, employing about 8 percent of 
workers. More than 40 percent of plants and about 25 percent of employees were 
not covered by a collective agreement, which means that their wages and working 
conditions were laid down in individual contracts. The presence and coverage of 
collective agreements steadily rises with establishment size, and this is also the 
case for works councils. All in all, works councils were set up in 13.6 percent of 
establishments, which however employed more than 50 percent of workers. While 
works councils are seldom found in small establishments, they are the norm in large 
companies where their legal powers are much stronger.
7 
The presence of collective agreements and of works councils in a plant may 
influence wage adjustments to economic shocks in various ways. According to the 
theory of implicit contracts (see Azariadis 1975), risk averse workers prefer a 
smooth development of wages instead of a highly volatile income. In contrast, firms 
– in face of imperfect capital markets – may have an incentive to share risks with 
their employees. If institutions such as collective bargaining or works councils exist, 
                                             
7   The determinants of works council existence are investigated, inter alia, by Addison et al. (2003) 
and Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), whereas the determinants of collective bargaining structure are 
studied by Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) and Schnabel, Zagelmeyer and Kohaut (2006). 7 
 
 
workers may have a better opportunity to prevent risks and to implement implicit 
contracts. A somewhat related view, expressed by Agell (2002, 108), would be that 
labor market institutions “serve an important function of social insurance”. In both 
views, these institutions should smoothen the development of wages. In particular, 
we expect that a change in the unemployment rate leads (in absolute terms) to a 
smaller adjustment of wages if such institutions do exist. 
The reaction of wages to the change in unemployment may not be symmetric, 
however, and whether institutions matter for the adjustment of wages may depend 
on the direction of the economic shock. More precisely, a Keynesian view would be 
that labor market institutions prevent wage cuts, resulting in downward wage rigidity 
(see Card and Hyslop 1997, 71). Hence, the existence of collective bargaining 
agreements and works councils should dampen wage adjustments to rising 
unemployment in order to protect workers’ wages. Therefore, we should observe a 
non-linear relationship between changes in wages and changes in the 
unemployment rate in establishments with collective agreements and/or works 
councils. According to this view, such institutions particularly matter for the 
adjustment of wages if the economic situation worsens. 
In the empirical analysis below, we investigate whether (and to which extent) labor 
market institutions such as collective bargaining and works councils do indeed 
matter for the adjustment of wages to economic shocks in western Germany. As 
indicators of changes in the economic situation, we use changes in the aggregate 
or regional rates of unemployment. 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
The data set used in the subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i.e. 
the linked employer-employee data set of the Institute for Employment Research 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). The LIAB combines the 
Employment Statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. For detailed 
information on the LIAB, see Alda, Bender and Gartner (2005). 
The employee side of our data set is the Employment Statistics, covering all 
employees and trainees subject to social security. They exclude, among others, the 
self-employed, family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (“Beamte”), students 
enrolled in higher education, and those in marginal employment. The employment 
statistics cover nearly 80 percent of all employed persons in western Germany and 
about 85 percent of employees in eastern Germany. They are collected by the 8 
 
 
social insurance institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced 
in 1973 and are made available to the Federal Employment Agency. Notifications 
are prescribed at the beginning and at the end of a person’s employment in a plant. 
In addition, an annual report for each employee is compulsory at the end of a year. 
Misreporting is legally sanctioned. The employment statistics contain information on 
an employee's occupation, the occupational status, and gross earnings up to the 
contribution assessment ceiling, as well as on individual characteristics like sex, 
age, nationality, and qualification. Each personnel record also contains the 
establishment identifier and the industry affiliation. 
The employer side of our data set is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a 
stratified random sample of establishments included in the Employment Statistics, 
where the strata are defined over industries and plant sizes (large plants are 
oversampled). In 1993, the panel started with 4,265 plants, covering 0.27 percent of 
all plants in western Germany (2 million) and 11 percent of total employment (29 
million). In 1996, the establishment panel also started in eastern Germany with 
4,313 establishments representing 1.1 percent of all plants (391,000) and 11 
percent of total employment (6 million). The IAB Establishment Panel has been set 
up for the needs of the Federal Employment Agency to provide information about 
the demand side of the labor market. Therefore, detailed information on the 
composition of the workforce and its development through time constitutes a major 
part of the questionnaire. Further questions concern training and further education, 
the total wage bill, standard hours, business activities, establishment policies, and 
general information about the plant like the existence of a works council and 
adopted bargaining agreements. With respect to the latter, plant managers are 
asked whether they apply a bargaining agreement (a) from the sectoral level or (b) 
from the firm level.  
The LIAB is created by linking the Employment Statistics and the IAB Establishment 
Panel through the establishment identifier which is available in both data sets. 
Because the Employment Statistics is spell-based (one record for each employment 
spell), the combined data set is potentially complex. To simplify, we select all 
workers in the employment statistics who are employed by the surveyed plants on 
June 30th in a year.
8  This yields an unbalanced annual panel of workers together 
with detailed information on the plants in which they work, which is unique for 
Germany. 
To this data, we merge information on the registered unemployment rate obtained 
from the Federal Employment Agency which is calculated by dividing the reported 
                                             
8   June 30th has been selected because most information in the IAB Establishment Panel refers to 
that date of a current year. 9 
 
 
number of unemployed persons at the end of June of the respective year by the 
sum of total unemployment and dependent civil employment. We use two different 
unemployment rates: (i) aggregated at the national level (of western Germany) and 
(ii) regional unemployment rates for 326 administrative districts (Landkreise und 
kreisfreie Städte – NUTS3 regions) in western Germany. This is the most 
disaggregated level for which labor market data are available. Therefore, we can 
compare whether changes in the aggregate unemployment rate and changes in 
(and between) the regional unemployment rate affect the adjustment of wages 
differently. 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the change in the real wage of a worker 
between two consecutive years, where average daily gross wages from the 
Employment Statistics have been deflated by the consumer price index obtained 
from the Federal Statistical Office (Fachserie 17 Reihe 7).
9 A shortcoming of the 
LIAB is that these daily gross wages are censored at the social security ceiling.
10 
One remedy of this data problem is to pursue single imputation, i.e. to impute the 
censored wages with estimated wages based on a Tobit regression (see Gartner 
2005 for details). However, we are analyzing below within-person variations in the 
individual wage, which the Tobit procedure does not take account of. In addition, 
the data-generating process for wages above the social security ceiling may differ 
from that governing lower wages, for instance since employees in the high-wage 
category (such as managers) usually negotiate on their own even if the firm makes 
use of collective bargaining for other employees. Therefore, imputation cannot help 
in our context to disclose the true relationship between wages and the regressors. 
For this reason, we have discarded observations with censored wages.
11 It should 
also be noted that due to the lack of information on actual hours worked, we were 
not able to calculate an hourly wage (which was used as the dependent variable by 
Peng and Siebert 2007, for example).
12 
                                             
9   Daily wages are calculated by dividing the reported compensation by the number of days within a 
spell. As noted above, our sample includes employment spells which comprise June 30th of a 
particular year. About three quarters of observations (and therefore also the compensation 
information) cover the whole year, while 98% of the spells cover at least half a year. Calculation 
of the average daily wage allows the comparison of wages between and within years, even for 
spells of different lengths. 
10  The ceiling for daily gross wages in 2000, for example, is at 143.92 Euro in western Germany.  
11   This reduced our regression sample by 9.7%. We have also dropped observations where 
reported wages were unreasonably low (i.e. wages below twice the limit for marginal workers, 
which is 21 Euro per day in 1998 and  26 Euro in 2005), because we reckon that in these cases 
either the wage or the information on working time was miscoded. This affected 1% of all 
observations. 
12  Therefore, our dependent variable (the change in real daily wages) may vary either because the 
hourly wage or because hours worked have changed. However, it should be noted that the extent 
of paid overtime is much lower in Germany than, for example, in Britain and Japan (see Hart 
2004, 13). 10 
 
 
We have imposed the following sample restrictions: We use the years 1999-2005 
since the questions on bargaining arrangements were continuously refined until 
1999. We have not included 2006 due to a break in the definition of the 
unemployment rate.
13 Our period of observation covers a complete business cycle. 
From 1997 to 2001, which was the period of the new-economy boom, 
unemployment was falling. With the burst of the new-economy bubble in 2001 
unemployment was rising again until 2005 (see Figure 1). 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
We focus on the private sector (without agriculture) for which the employment 
statistics cover nearly 100% of all workers. Our analysis is based on western 
Germany (since the eastern German labor market is still in a special transformation 
process) and restricted to full-time employees, because of the lack of hours worked, 
such that the monthly income of part-timers cannot be compared to that of full-time 
employees. We restrict our analysis to wage changes of stayers, i.e. of persons 
who worked for the same firm in the same occupation in two consecutive years, 
since wage changes of movers may be due to endogenous mobility. 
Finally, we only look at plants which employ between 5 and 499 employees in the 
first year they enter our sample frame. This is because a works council may only be 
elected if the plant has at least 5 employees and because almost all plants with 500 
and more employees do have a works council (see Table 1).
14 In addition, this 
restriction ensures that our results are not driven by very few large plants. 
The empirical results of section 4 are based on the following equation of worker-
level changes in the real wage: 
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13   More precisely, since the Hartz-Reform came into effect in Germany on 1 January 2005, 
registered unemployment is based on a wider definition because former recipients of social 
assistance now have to register at the local employment agencies in order to claim the new 
unemployment benefit II.  A jump in the reported unemployment figure in January 2005 can 
indeed be observed (see Jacobi and Kluve (2007), who give an economic and institutional 
description of the German labor market before and after the Hartz-Reform). Since we use the 
lagged change in unemployment as a regressor in our estimation framework (see below), any 
change in the reported unemployment rate between 2005 and 2004 is to a considerable degree 
due to this redefinition and cannot be used to explain the change in individual wages between 
2006 and 2005. 
14  This basically means that we ignore establishments with a plant size where the distributions of 




There are i=1, … , N individuals, j=1, … , J plants, r=1, … , R regions and t=1, … , T 
time periods. ∆ denotes the difference operator, such that our dependent variable  
(∆lnwit= lnwit –lnwit-1) is the change in the real daily wage of worker i between two 
consecutive years. ∆urt-1 defines the change in the regional unemployment rate, 
lagged by one period. If wages adjust procyclically, then the impact of ∆urt-1 on 
∆lnwit  is negative. Equation (1) assumes that the effects of rising and falling 
unemployment are equal, which will be relaxed in subsequent analysis. αr is a 
regional fixed effect and εit captures the remaining error term. Due to the inclusion 
of regional fixed effects, the parameter estimate of β
u is identified via within-regional 
variations in ∆urt-1, which may be driven by regional-specific developments or by 
changes in the aggregate unemployment rate. We can infer which component is 
more important by comparing the estimate of β
u with an estimate from an 
alternative specification, where ur is replaced by the aggregate western German 
unemployment rate.
15  
We are mainly interested in whether wage cyclicality (i.e. the impact of ∆urt-1 on  
∆lnwit ) varies with the prevailing institutional setting at plant level. As described in 
section 2, the German system of industrial relations is characterized by 
representation through trade unions (which bargain over wages at the sectoral or at 
the firm level) and through works councils, such that there are six possible 
combinations which could exist in a plant:  
 
industrial relations regimes (IRk)  no works council  works council 
no bargaining  1  2 
sectoral bargaining  3  4 
firm bargaining  5  6 
 
We denote the different types of industrial relations regimes by IRk (k=1, … , 6). The 
distribution of these regimes in our regression sample is reported in Appendix Table 
1. It is apparent that types (1), (3) and (4) cover in each case about 30 percent of all 
plants, while the other regimes play only a minor role. At the individual level, as 
much as almost 60 percent of workers are employed by type (4) plants (sectoral 
bargaining, works council), reflecting the fact that this type is more likely to exist in 
                                             
15   As the unemployment rate varies only at a higher level (different years respectively different 
regions), conventional standard error estimates should be downward biased since the error term 
tends to be correlated across individuals in the same year respectively in the same region. For 
this reason, we have clustered the standard errors at the year-level (when using the aggregated 
unemployment rate) respectively at the regional-level (when using the regional unemployment 
rate). Angrist and Pischke (2008) provide evidence that in the case of a larger number of groups 
using clustered standard errors is equivalent to a two-stage procedure, which has traditionally 
been applied in the literature on wage cyclicality (see, for example, Shin and Solon, 2007). 12 
 
 
large plants. In our estimation framework, we do not want to impose any restrictions 
a priori, and therefore allow wage cyclicality to vary between all six regimes IRk. 
Hence, we include five dummy variables IRk and five interaction terms between the 
change in the unemployment rate ∆urt-1  and IRk  (k=2, … , 6), such that the wage 
cyclicality for the reference group (type 1) is given by β
u
. Figure 2 presents the 
development of wage changes (∆lnwit) separately for the different regimes. It can be 
seen that wage growth is higher during boom years and lower during the recession, 
but at first glance there is no clear pattern concerning differences across regimes. 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
The regressions include finally a vector of control variables 1 − it Z , which comprises 
the following individual and plant-level characteristics (dated at time t-1), all of 
which may influence the development of individual wages: dummies for gender and 
non-German citizenship, the potential work experience, dummies for educational 
attainment and 10 categories for occupational status, an indicator for the plant’s 
production technology as well as dummies for sectoral affiliation and establishment 
size classes. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, the change in the 
unemployment rate and the control variables are reported in Appendix Table 2. We 
turn now to the results of estimating equation (1) and its modifications. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of our empirical investigations. In each table, we 
present three models that differ in the business cycle variable used: one includes 
the aggregate unemployment rate (model 1), and the other two use the regional 
unemployment rate without (model 2) and with regional fixed effects (model 3). In 
the following, we will concentrate on the parameter estimates of the unemployment 
rates and the industrial relation variables as well as on their interactions without 
discussing the results of the control variables in detail. Suffice to say that in both 
tables and in all models most of the individual-level and plant-level control variables 
are statistically significant and show plausible signs of coefficients. 
 




Starting with Table 2, we see that in all three models changes in the unemployment 
rate are negatively related to yearly wage changes.
16 If the aggregate 
unemployment rate rises by one percentage point, wage growth in the reference 
group (no collective bargaining and no works council) is 0.85 percentage points 
lower compared to the situation where unemployment remains constant. Although 
the effect of the aggregate unemployment rate on wage growth is much larger than 
the effect of the regional unemployment rate, their confidence intervals overlap.
17 
We should also point out that controlling for regional heterogeneity (model 3) does 
not change the picture further. 
Looking at the industrial relation variables, it turns out that the existence of a works 
council does not affect wage changes if the establishment is not covered by 
collective bargaining. It can also be seen that collective bargaining matters: in 
establishments with multi-employer collective bargaining and works councils as well 
as in establishments with single-employer bargaining (with or without a works 
council), wage rises are significantly higher. Firms with collective bargaining and 
works councils are high-wage firms, which apparently also exhibit higher wage 
growth.
18 Interestingly, the interactions of the change in unemployment and of the 
existence of collective bargaining and/or works councils do not prove to be 
significant in all three models. Therefore, in contrast to our expectations, firms’ 
reactions to the business cycle are found to be the same under different regimes. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
To investigate this surprising non-relationship between institutions and wage 
adjustment more closely and to allow for asymmetric reactions to changes in the 
unemployment rate, we now distinguish between rising and falling unemployment. 
The first two rows of Table 3 indicate that for the reference group (no collective 
bargaining, no works council) there is indeed an asymmetric reaction since the 
significant impact of the unemployment rate identified above only holds if 
unemployment falls. While a reduction in the unemployment rate is associated with 
a statistically significant increase in wages, the reaction of wages to a rise in 
                                             
16  In order to see whether it is the change in the unemployment rate or its level (as in the Phillips 
curve) that affects wage changes, we conducted a test proposed by Card and Hyslop (1997) in 
which the Phillips curve specification was clearly rejected; results are available from the authors. 
17  In fact, if we use for model 1 the two-stage procedure which has been traditionally applied in the 
literature on wage cyclicality, the standard errors for the aggregate unemployment rate become 
very large such that the coefficient is statistically insignificant (while still being at -0.85). The 
difference between the clustered standard errors and the errors arising from a two-stage 
procedure for model 1 is due to the very low number of clusters (7 years) in this model. 
18  This is consistent with the general increase of wage differentials in Germany observed in the last 
two decades (see Dustmann et al. 2009). 14 
 
 
unemployment proves to be insignificant.
19 Looking at the interaction effects of the 
unemployment rates and the industrial relation dummies, it can be seen that the 
adjustment is significantly different for the regime with sectoral bargaining and with 
a works council (regime 4, which prevails in our sample). In this group of plants, 
wages react differently compared to the regime without bargaining and without a 
works council, and this holds both for reductions and for increases in 
unemployment. 
In order to simplify the interpretation of the complex interactions parameters of 
(positive or negative) changes in unemployment rates and various industrial 
relations regimes, Figure 3 provides a simulation of the effects, which is based on 
the estimated coefficients of model 2 in Table 3. Taking these coefficients at face 
value (no matter whether they differ in a statistically significant way), we have 
simulated the wage change resulting from a change in the unemployment rate by 
one standard deviation (i.e. 1.22 percentage points). We have not included 
establishments with firm-level bargaining and without a works council (regime 5) 
due to the low number of observations in this group. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
Starting with the three regimes with a works council (types 2, 4 and 6, depicted by 
filled squares), it turns out that for stable unemployment (i.e. ∆urt-1 = 0) the wage 
growth of workers covered by firm or sectoral bargaining (regime 4 and regime 6) is 
higher than that of workers not covered by collective bargaining. However, the 
reaction of wages to declining unemployment is lower if the establishment applies a 
bargaining agreement. In other words, within the group of firms with a works council 
an economic upswing is associated with a growth path of wages that is smoother 
(but starts on a higher level) if collective bargaining takes place.
20 
Looking at rising unemployment, we obtain two surprising results. First, we do not 
find a reaction of wage growth to an economic downswing in firms not bound by 
collective bargaining. An explanation could be that fairness considerations may lead 
to downward wage rigidities even in the absence of labor market institutions (see 
                                             
16  For model 1, the parameter estimate on reduction in the unemployment rate is very large (-1.45), 
but again very badly determined. 
20  For example, if unemployment does not change, (i.e. ∆urt-1 = 0), the wage growth in plants with a 
works council but not covered by collective agreement amounts to 1.64 percent (setting all 
covariates to zero), while the respective figure is about 1 percentage point higher for plants with a 
works council and with a bargaining agreement at the sectoral level. However, if unemployment 
falls by 1.5 percentage points, say, then wage growth is exactly the same in both groups (2.9 
percent). Once again, this is because wage growth reacts stronger for plants without a bargaining 
agreement (where it increases from 1.6 to 2.9 percent) whereas the growth path is smoother for 
plants with a bargaining agreement at the sectoral level (where wage growth increases only from 
2.6 percent to 2.9 percent). 15 
 
 
Bewley 1999). Second, we find that firms with a sectoral bargaining regime do react 
to rising unemployment. This is in contrast to our expectations that downward 
rigidities are caused or reinforced by formal labor market institutions. An 
explanation for this observation may be the existence of opening clauses in 
collective contracts, which allow firms (with the consent of works councils) to 
deviate from sectoral agreements in order to secure jobs. In addition, more than 40 
percent of plants covered by collective agreements pay wages above the level 
stipulated in the agreement and these so-called wage cushions can easily be reduced if 
the economic situation worsens (see Jung and Schnabel 2009). Taken together, there 
is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment under sectoral 
bargaining (regime 4), but wage growth reacts asymmetrically in plants without 
collective bargaining (regime 2) as well as in plants with firm-level agreements 
(regime 6). 
A reasonably similar pattern is found for the regimes without work councils (types 1 
and 3 depicted by empty squares). If unemployment falls it makes no difference 
whether or not the firm is covered by sectoral bargaining, but if unemployment rises 
we again observe downward wage rigidity only in firms without collective 
bargaining. Similar to the regimes with works councils, we find that the reaction of 
wages set at sectoral level is nearly symmetric, whereas wages that are not 
collectively bargained (dotted line, 1) adjust asymmetrically. 
Finally, we make comparisons within the same bargaining regime to assess the 
effect of works councils. If wages are not set by collective bargaining, works 
councils do not make a difference (lines 1 and 2 are close together). If wages are 
negotiated at sectoral level (lines 3 and 4), however, the existence of a works 
council leads to a higher wage growth for given unemployment and a smoother 




Using a large-scale linked employer-employee data set for western Germany, this 
paper has investigated the impact of collective bargaining and works councils on 
the adjustment of real wages to changes in unemployment. We find that works 
councils affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining but not in 
firms which make use of individual contracts. This suggests that establishment-
based works councils cannot (and do not) serve as substitutes for sectoral trade 
unions. We also find that wage adjustments to positive and negative economic 
shocks are not always symmetric. In times of declining unemployment there is a 16 
 
 
negative relationship between wage changes and unemployment, with wage growth 
being lower if the firm applies a bargaining agreement from the sectoral or the firm 
level. In contrast, if the economic situation worsens and unemployment rises, 
wages react to unemployment only if a sectoral bargaining agreement exists, 
whereas there are some hints on downward wage rigidity in establishments without 
collective bargaining and in establishment with firm-level bargaining. Hence, 
although the reactions to economic shocks are not as clear-cut as expected and 
differ between industrial relations regimes, there are some signs that labor market 
institutions do indeed matter for wage cyclicality. 
That said, it is obvious that our paper can only be regarded as a first step towards 
understanding the impact of labor market institutions on wage cyclicality. Due to 
data limitations, we were only able to investigate the cyclicality of daily earnings, 
while it will be interesting to decompose fluctuations in daily earnings into changes 
in the hourly wage and the number of hours worked. In addition, future research 
should investigate more deeply the role of bargaining institutions and works 
councils for downward wage rigidity on the one hand and for implicit contracts on 
the other hand. The asymmetric reactions of wages under different industrial 
relations regimes found in our paper could also stimulate macroeconomic research 
since macroeconomic theory has largely neglected such asymmetries and the role 
of labor market institutions in wage adjustments. The different reactions of wages 
and employment across countries and industrial relations regimes in the wake of 
the 2008-09 world-wide economic crisis may provide an interesting field experiment 
for additional empirical research on wage cyclicality. 
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Figure 1:  Unemployment rate in western Germany 
 
 
Note: Unemployment rate in June of a respective year. 
Source: German Federal Labor Office.  20 
 
 




Note: Wage changes are changes between two consecutive years in log wages. 



































Note: Simulation of the reaction of wages (change between two consecutive years in log wages) to a 
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Table 1:  Presence and coverage of collective agreements and works councils by 





at sectoral level 
Collective agreement 
at firm level 
Works Council 
  Presence Coverage Presence Coverage Presence  Coverage 
  5 - 19  50.2 50.9  3.0  3.5  6.2  7.7 
20 -  99  65.3 66.9  6.7  5.4  35.2  41.5 
100 – 499  67.1 67.9 10.6 12.4 75.8  79.5 
500 and above  74.2 79.7 12.0 11.3 95.7  96.6 
            
Average 53.4  65.6  3.9  7.9  13.6  53.7 
Notes: Presence refers to the share of establishments with a collective agreement respectively a 
works council. Coverage denotes the share of employees working in an establishment with a works 
council. Plants with less than five employees as well as agriculture and the public sector are 
excluded. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 7, 1999. 22 
 
 
Table 2:   Determinants of individual level wage changes; OLS; western Germany 
(Dependent variable: change between two consecutive years in log 
wages) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Level of aggregation of unemployment 
rate 










Explanatory Variables:         
Change in unemployment rate  
(in %)   
-0.8546 (2.09)* -0.3964 (3.35)***  -0.4043 (3.29)*** 
Bargaining agreement and works council 
existence (dummies)     
(1) No bargaining/ no works council 
     (reference)  ---  ---  ---  
(2) No bargaining/ works council     0.0013 (0.94) 0.0012 (0.73) 0.0020 (1.15) 
(3) Sectoral bargaining/ no works 
      council  0.0008 (0.63) 0.0008 (0.71) 0.0008 (0.63) 
(4) Sectoral bargaining/ works 
      council      0.0061 (2.84)** 0.0062 (5.40)***  0.0063 (5.13)*** 
(5) Firm bargaining/ no works council  0.0103 (2.74)** 0.0113 (2.98)***  0.0105 (2.91)*** 
(6) Firm bargaining/ works council     0.0034 (2.71)** 0.0037 (1.97)*  0.0044 (2.31)** 
Change in unemployment rate interacted 
with …     
   No bargaining/ no works council 
   (reference)  ---  ---  ---  
   No bargaining/ works council     0.0263 (0.21) 0.0606 (0.31) 0.1262 (0.65) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ no works 
   council  -0.1270 (0.92) -0.1622 (1.07) -0.1149 (0.76) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ works 
   council      0.1561 (0.73) 0.0368 (0.29) 0.0918 (0.71) 
   Firm bargaining/ no works council  0.0984 (0.21) 0.2560 (0.47) 0.3130 (0.61) 
   Firm bargaining/ works council     0.1094 (1.00) 0.2004 (0.86) 0.2727 (1.13) 
New production technology (dummy)  0.0026 (2.49)**  0.0027 (3.74)***  0.0025 (3.36)*** 
Missing information on production 
technology (dummy)  0.0050 (3.29)** 0.0033  (1.08)  0.0020 (0.60) 
Female (Dummy)  -0.0014 (2.97)**  -0.0013 (2.80)***  -0.0015 (3.52)*** 
Foreign Citizenship (Dummy)  -0.0015 (2.03)*  -0.0014 (2.51)**  -0.0018 (3.36)*** 
Potential work experience (in years) 
 
-0.0010 (15.5)*** -0.0010 (43.9)*** -0.0010 (45.4)*** 
Educational  attainment dummies (ref. 
group: without apprenticeship or Abitur)     
   Apprenticeship, no Abitur   -0.0017 (3.49)**  -0.0017 (3.25)***  -0.0020 (4.24)*** 
   No Apprenticeship, with Abitur   0.0077 (8.72)*** 0.0076 (4.66)*** 0.0068 (4.15)*** 
   Apprenticeship and Abitur   0.0029 (3.72)***  0.0028 (3.25)***  0.0023 (2.82)*** 
   Technical college degree   0.0047 (3.94)***  0.0046 (5.16)***  0.0038 (4.62)*** 
   University degree      0.0022 (2.43)*  0.0022 (1.27)  0.0013 (0.79) 
   Education unknown   -0.0257 (12.1)*** -0.0254 (21.1)*** -0.0260 (23.0)*** 
Occupational dummies (ref. group: basic 
manual occupation) 
   
   Qualified manual occupation  -0.0008 (0.54)  -0.0008 (1.32)  -0.0009 (1.62) 
   Engineer, technician  0.0066 (4.77)*** 0.0066 (9.27)*** 0.0064 (9.69)*** 
   Basic service occupation  -0.0016 (1.73)  -0.0016 (2.04)**  -0.0013 (1.76)* 23 
 
 
   Qualified service occupation  -0.0042 (0.76)  -0.0041 (0.95)  -0.0050 (1.08) 
   Semi-professional  0.0044 (1.11)  0.0042 (0.92)  0.0037 (0.79) 
   Professional  0.0073 (2.28)*  0.0074 (2.87)***  0.0077 (3.25)*** 
   Basic business occupation  0.0025 (1.47)  0.0024 (2.41)**  0.0026 (2.62)*** 
   Qualified business occupation  0.0099 (6.66)*** 0.0098 (13.4)*** 0.0098 (14.9)*** 
   Manager  0.0078 (2.68)**  0.0078 (5.41)***  0.0081 (5.84)*** 
     
Constant 0.0201 (5.34)***  0.0186 (6.40)***  0.0202 (5.51)*** 
R
2             0.0241             0.0226    0.0219 
Notes: 882,576 observations from 6,815 plants in each regression. Regressions also include 
dummies for 8 sectors and 9 plant size classes. |t|-statistics in parentheses, based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the year- (Model 1) respectively at the regional-level 
(Models 2 and 3). The sample comprises the years 1999-2005. 24 
 
 
Table 3:  Determinants of individual level wage changes; OLS; western Germany; 
asymmetric effects of positive and negative changes in the     
unemployment rate (Dependent variable: change between two 
consecutive years in log wages) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Level of aggregation of unemployment 
rate 










Explanatory Variables:         
Change in unemployment rate  
(in %) x dummy change positive  -0.0131 (0.01) 0.1256 (0.56) 0.0534 (0.23) 
Change in unemployment rate  
(in %) x dummy change negative  -1.4562 (1.16) -0.8281 (3.43)***  -0.7882 (3.23)*** 
Bargaining agreement and works council 
existence (dummies)     
(1) No bargaining/ no works council 
    (reference)  ---  ---  ---  
(2) No bargaining/ works council     0.0008 (0.36) 0.0009 (0.31) 0.0021 (0.66) 
(3) Sectoral bargaining/ no works 
      council  0.0032 (3.32)** 0.0024 (1.14)  0.0022 (1.01) 
(4) Sectoral bargaining/ works 
      council      0.0115 (7.53)*** 0.0109 (5.39)*** 0.0111 (5.26)*** 
(5) Firm bargaining/ no works council  0.0091 (1.14) 0.0206 (3.15)***  0.0215 (3.55)*** 
(6) Firm bargaining/ works council     0.0046 (1.71) 0.0047 (1.46) 0.0053 (1.59) 
Change in unemployment rate  
(in %) x dummy change positive 
 interacted with … 
   
   No bargaining/ no works council 
   (reference)  ---  ---  ---  
   No bargaining/ works council     0.0851 (0.23) 0.0830 (0.20) 0.0941 (0.22) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ no works 
   Council  -0.7067 (2.86)** -0.4273 (1.50)  -0.3550 (1.23) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ works 
   council      -1.1262 (6.23)*** -0.7260 (2.93)*** -0.6836 (2.75)*** 
   Firm bargaining/ no works council  0.4174 (0.24) -1.3956 (1.69)*  -1.6987 (1.97)* 
   Firm bargaining/ works council     -0.1545 (0.40) 0.0755 (0.12) 0.1625 (0.26) 
Change in unemployment rate  
(in %) x dummy change negative 
 interacted with … 
   
   No bargaining/ no works council 
   (reference)  ---  ---  ---  
   No bargaining/ works council     -0.0627 (0.35) -0.0091 (0.03)  0.1142 (0.33) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ no works 
   Council  0.2840 (3.07)** 0.0470 (0.17)  0.0802 (0.28) 
   Sectoral bargaining/ works 
   council      1.0660 (4.66)*** 0.6590 (2.51)**  0.7246 (2.76)*** 
   Firm bargaining/ no works council  0.0305 (0.03) 1.3371 (1.73)*  1.6068 (2.48)** 
   Firm bargaining/ works council     0.3163 (1.26) 0.3670 (0.99) 0.4132 (1.09) 
New production technology (dummy)  0.0026 (2.59)** 0.0028 (3.81)***  0.0026 (3.47)*** 
Missing information on production 
technology (dummy)  0.0046 (2.29)* 0.0034 (1.10)  0.0020 (0.60) 
Female (Dummy)  -0.0014 (2.82)**  -0.0013 (2.82)***  -0.0015 (3.50)*** 
Foreign Citizenship (Dummy)  -0.0015 (2.10)*  -0.0014 (2.58)**  -0.0018 (3.40)*** 
Potential work experience (in  years)  -0.0010 (17.1)*** -0.0010 (44.3)*** -0.0010 (45.8)*** 
Educational  attainment dummies (ref.       25 
 
 
group: without apprenticeship or Abitur) 
   Apprenticeship, no Abitur   -0.0017 (3.69)**  -0.0017 (3.29)***  -0.0020 (4.27)*** 
   No Apprenticeship, with Abitur   0.0077 (8.74)*** 0.0076 (4.67)*** 0.0068 (4.15)*** 
   Apprenticeship and Abitur   0.0029 (3.76)***  0.0028 (3.26)***  0.0023 (2.84)*** 
   Technical college degree   0.0046 (3.90)***  0.0046 (5.12)***  0.0038 (4.59)*** 
   University degree      0.0022 (2.42)*  0.0021 (1.23)  0.0012 (0.77) 
   Education unknown   -0.0257 (12.6)*** -0.0256 (21.1)*** -0.0261 (22.9)*** 
Occupational dummies (ref. group: basic 
manual occupation) 
   
   Qualified manual occupation  -0.0008 (0.54)  -0.0008 (1.27)  -0.0009 (1.59) 
   Engineer, technician  0.0066 (4.81)*** 0.0066 (9.30)*** 0.0065 (9.76)*** 
   Basic service occupation  -0.0015 (1.71)  -0.0015 (1.92)*  -0.0012 (1.64) 
   Qualified service occupation  -0.0042 (0.76)  -0.0042 (0.97)  -0.0051 (1.17) 
   Semi-professional  0.0044 (1.11)  0.0042 (0.89)  0.0037 (0.79) 
   Professional  0.0074 (2.27)*  0.0074 (2.89)***  0.0078 (3.27)*** 
   Basic business occupation  0.0025 (1.53)  0.0024 (2.38)**  0.0025 (2.60)*** 
   Qualified business occupation  0.0099 (6.92)*** 0.0098 (13.4)*** 0.0098 (14.9)*** 
   Manager  0.0078 (2.66)**  0.0077 (5.51)***  0.0081 (5.91)*** 
     
Constant 0.0166 (2.91)**  0.0155 (4.81)***  0.0172 (4.32)*** 
R
2             0.0244             0.0230    0.0229 
Notes: 882,576 observations from 6,815 plants in each regression. Regressions also include 
dummies for 8 sectors and 9 plant size classes. |t|-statistics in parentheses, based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the year- (Model 1) respectively at the regional-level 




Appendix Table 1:  Regression sample by bargaining agreements and works 
council existence 
Industrial relations  Workers  Plants 
regimes  Observations Frequency (%)  Observations  Frequency (%) 
(1)  No bargaining/  
no works council  100,268 11.36  3,956  27.07 
(2)  No bargaining/  
works council     90,410 10.24  884  6.05 
(3)  Sectoral bargaining/ 
no works council  99,473 11.27  4,468  30.57 
(4)  Sectoral bargaining/ 
works council      503,341 57.03  4,436  30.35 
(5)  Firm bargaining/  
no works council  5,445 0.62  156  1.07 
(6)  Firm bargaining/ 




Appendix Table 2:   Descriptive Statistics of regression sample 
Variables Mean  Std.Dev. 
Change (between two years) in log wages  0.025  0.082 
Change in regional unemployment rate (in %)  -0.001  0.009 
Change in regional unemployment rate (in %)  x  
dummy change positive  0.003 0.005 
Change in regional unemployment rate (in %)  x  
dummy change negative  -0.004 0.005 
Plant size (number of employees)  230,955  178,044 
New production technology (dummy)  0.715  0.452 
Missing information on production technology (dummy)  0.010  0.099 
Female (dummy)  0.252  0.434 
Foreign Citizenship (dummy)  0.093  0.291 
Potential work experience (in years)  23.832  10.917 
Educational  attainment dummies      
   Without apprenticeship or Abitur 0.185  0.388 
   Apprenticeship, no Abitur  0.663  0.473 
   No Apprenticeship, with Abitur   0.006  0.079 
   Apprenticeship and Abitur   0.044  0.204 
   Technical college degree   0.022  0.148 
   University degree      0.018  0.132 
   Education unknown   0.062  0.242 
Occupational dummies      
   Basic manual occupation  0.295  0.456 
   Qualified manual occupation  0.226  0.418 
   Engineer, technician  0.085  0.278 
   Basic service occupation  0.109  0.311 
   Qualified service occupation  0.005  0.067 
   Semi-professional  0.002  0.050 
   Professional  0.004  0.063 
   Basic business occupation  0.049  0.216 
   Qualified business occupation  0.216  0.412 
   Manager  0.010  0.099 
Observations 882,576   
 
 
 